Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd: The End of Unilateral Appointment of Arbitrator in India by Garg, Meenal
Christ University Law Journal 




Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC 
(India) Ltd: The End of Unilateral 
Appointment of Arbitrator in India 
Meenal Garg* 
1. Introduction 
The power of a party to unilaterally appoint a sole arbitrator in 
India has been a subject of much litigation and debate for quite 
some time.  The unilateral appointment of an arbitrator refers to a 
scenario in which one party to the arbitration agreement is given 
sole authority to appoint an arbitrator, in case a reference to 
arbitration is made by either of the parties. Such clauses are very 
common in government contracts, contracts with financial 
institutions etc., where a high ranking official of the tendering 
authority, say the Chief Engineer, is given the authority to appoint 
an arbitrator in case a reference to arbitration is made by either the 
tendering authority or the contractor. 
Recently, the Supreme Court in the case of Perkins Eastman 
Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd1 (hereinafter referred to as 
“Perkins judgement”) has finally laid to rest this controversy by 
holding that no party who has any interest in the dispute can 
unilaterally appoint a sole arbitrator. In this paper, the author 
makes a case that the Perkins judgment is flawed and at the same 
time the author discusses the possible implications of the same. 
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1Perkins Eastman Architects D.P.C. v. H.S.C.C. (India) Ltd., 2019 S.C.C. 
Online SC 1517 (India). 
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2. Position of Law 
Prior to examining the Perkins case, it is pertinent to briefly 
describe the jurisprudence with regards to the unilateral 
appointment of an arbitrator in India. Before the commencement of 
Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, the 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the Act)2 had no restrictions 
regarding the unilateral appointment of arbitrators by one party. 
Subsequently, the Arbitration and Conciliation Amendment Act, 
2015 amended Section 123 and introduced the Fifth and Seventh 
Schedules in the Act, to prohibit the appointment of certain persons 
as arbitrators. However, the Act remained silent on the unilateral 
authority of one party to appoint an arbitrator.  
In the case of Voestalpine Schienen GmbH v. Delhi Metro Rail 
Corporation Ltd (hereinafter referred to as Voestalpine judgement),4 
the Supreme Court held that the power of one party to unilaterally 
appoint an arbitrator is valid. In this case, the arbitration clause 
provided that the respondent shall appoint a sole arbitrator from a 
panel of arbitrators provided by the petitioner. Therefore, the 
Supreme Court, while upholding the appointment procedure 
prescribed in agreement, held that the respondent could only 
appoint an arbitrator from such a panel.  
Thereafter, the case of TRF Limited v. Energo Engineering Projects Ltd 
(hereinafter referred to as the TRF judgement)5 proved to be a 
turning point with regard to unilateral appointment of an 
arbitrator. In this case, the Managing Director of the respondent or 
his nominee was to act as the sole arbitrator. However, pursuant to 
the 2015 Amendment, the Managing Director became ineligible to 
act as an arbitrator as per Section 12 of the Act. Consequently, he 
had appointed a former Judge as his nominee. Therefore, the 
                                                          
2The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, No.26, Acts of Parliament, 1996 
(India). 
3§12, The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, No.26, Acts of Parliament, 1996 
(India). 
4Voestalpine Schienen GmbH v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd (2017) 4 
S.C.C. 665 (India). 
5TRF Ltd. v.  Energo Engineering Projects Ltd.  (2017) 8 S.C.C. 377 (India). 
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question arose whether the nominee of an ineligible person could 
act as an arbitrator. The Supreme Court while applying the maxim 
Qui facit per alium facit per se (He who acts through another does the 
act himself) held that the nominee of an ineligible arbitrator cannot 
act as an arbitrator. However, the Supreme Court did not comment 
upon the unilateral appointment of an arbitrator. 
3. Facts 
In the light of the aforementioned situation, the author now turns 
to the Perkins judgment. The relevant facts of the case are that the 
respondent had invited tender for certain design consultancy work, 
which was allotted to the applicant. Subsequently, disputes arose 
between the two parties and the applicant sent a notice to the 
Chairman and Managing Director (CMD) for the appointment of 
an arbitrator in accordance with clause 24 of the contract, which 
provided for the appointment of a sole arbitrator by CMD of the 
respondent Corporation. Subsequently, Major K.T. Gajria was 
appointed as the sole arbitrator. Aggrieved by the said 
appointment, the applicant filed a Section 11 application before the 
Supreme Court, alleging that an independent and impartial 
arbitrator be appointed instead of Major K.T. Gajria. 
4. Judgment  
The first issue before the Court was whether the present arbitration 
is an international commercial arbitration or not. The Court held 
that since the applicant was the lead member of the consortium that 
had its registered office in New York, the present matter would be 
classified under international commercial arbitration.6  
The next and the more crucial issue was whether the Court could 
exercise its powers under Section 11 of the Act. The Supreme Court 
while relying on the TRF judgement held that, “Naturally, the 
person who has an interest in the outcome or decision of the 
dispute must not have the power to appoint a sole arbitrator.”7 The 
                                                          
6Perkins Eastman Architects D.P.C. v. H.S.C.C. (India) Ltd., 2019 S.C.C. 
Online SC 1517 (India). 
7Id at 10 
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basis given by the Supreme Court for such reasoning was that in 
cases where there is a sole appointment of an arbitrator, there is 
always some degree of exclusivity in charting the course of dispute 
resolution.8 Furthermore, while referring to its earlier rulings and 
the 246th Law Commission Report, the Court held that neutrality of 
arbitrators is of utmost importance.9 Consequently, the 
appointment of Major K.T. Gajria was quashed and Retd. Justice 
A.K. Sikri was appointed as the arbitrator. 
5. Aftermath of Perkins: An Analysis 
The Supreme Court has given its reasoning by extending the 
rationale of the TRF judgment and has laid down a blanket 
prohibition on the appointment of an arbitrator by an ineligible 
party. However, according to this author, the Court has failed to 
distinguish the facts of the TRF judgement and the current case. In 
the former, the appointment of a nominee of an ineligible arbitrator 
was quashed, whereas in the Perkins judgement, there was 
appointment by one of the parties. Incidentally, the Delhi High 
Court was faced with a similar question of law. The Court while 
interpreting the TRF judgement had given the reasoning that TRF 
does not fetter the power of one party to appoint a sole arbitrator, 
as Section 11(2) of the Act gives an option to the parties to agree on 
any form of the procedure for appointment. The Court, in another 
case, held that proviso to Section 12(5) of the Act also gives an 
option to waive off any grounds for a challenge by an agreement in 
writing.10 Thus,  the Supreme Court has failed to take into account 
this interpretation and has wrongly relied upon the rationale of the 
TRF judgement. The correct procedure in such cases would be to 
test the independence and impartiality, adhering strictly to the 
grounds mentioned in the Act. The fact that an arbitrator is 
appointed by one party, cannot be termed as a ground for removal 
of the arbitrator.  
Another argument which can be put forward is that the Apex 
Court has resorted to unnecessary judicial legislation. The 2015 
                                                          
8Id at 16 
9Id. 
10D.K. Gupta v. Renu Munjal, 2017 S.C.C. Online Del. 12385 (India). 
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Amendment Act had specifically incorporated the Fifth and 
Seventh schedules in the Act, to maintain the bare minimum 
standards of independence and impartiality. Moreover, as noticed 
in the aforementioned case of D.K. Gupta v. Renu Munjal11, the 
legislature has provided the parties with an option to waive off the 
requirements of Section 12. Therefore, if the legislature would have 
desired to abolish the concept of unilateral appointment, it would 
have done so by means of the 2015 Amendment or the more recent 
2019 Amendment Act. By extending the TRF rationale, the Court 
has created an entirely new ground for removal of the arbitrator. 
Furthermore, whether the parties can waive off this ground is a 
question which still remains open for interpretation. 
Even if mutual consent is accepted as a basis of appointment of an 
arbitrator, it is unclear as to what are the contours of such consent. 
In other words, it is unclear whether the judgment of Voestalpine 
still holds good or not. In the author’s opinion, the Voestalpine 
judgment still holds good, as in that case a panel of arbitrators is 
submitted by one party and the sole arbitrator is appointed out of 
this panel of arbitrators. Such an appointment procedure can be 
construed as a broad form of appointment by mutual consent and 
not a case of unilateral appointment, as both parties have a say in 
the appointment of the arbitrator. 
In spite of its various flaws, it would be prudent to assume that the 
Perkins judgment is here to stay. Therefore, it is necessary that the 
impact of this judgment is analyzed as it directly hits arbitration 
clauses envisaged in government contracts, contracts with financial 
institutions etc. The most immediate impact of this judgment 
would be on future arbitrations which would arise from contracts 
containing unilateral appointment clauses. In this respect, it would 
be advisable that to avoid Section 1112 proceedings, an independent 
and impartial arbitrator is appointed with mutual consent of the 
parties, until necessary amendments are made in such contracts.  
This can be done in a number of ways. For instance, one party can 
suggest a panel of arbitrators and the other party may choose one 
                                                          
11Id.  
12§11, The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, No.26, Acts of Parliament, 
1996 (India). 
Christ University Law Journal Vol. 9, No.2                                 ISSN 2278-4322 
104 
arbitrator from amongst the panel. Another way could be by 
substitution of a sole arbitrator with a panel of three arbitrators. In 
such a scenario, each party could appoint its nominee arbitrator 
and the two arbitrators could appoint the presiding arbitrator. 
However, it is also necessary to mention here that it is a rare sight 
to see appointments by mutual consent, especially in cases of 
government contracts. Therefore, in light of such difficulty, Vikas 
Mahendra and Shalija Agarwal have emphasized on the role of 
arbitral institutions as appointing authority, for appointing a sole 
authority under the agreement.13 Such an alternative appears to be 
lucrative in the light of the Arbitration and Conciliation 
(Amendment) Act, 2019, which seeks to promote institutional 
arbitration in India. Moreover, appointment from arbitral 
institutions may prove to be more beneficial, as such institutions 
can appoint a specialized arbitrator from a panel of qualified 
arbitrators. However, it is also noteworthy to mention here that the 
present system of institutional arbitration in India is substandard 
and underdeveloped. Currently, there is a lack of credible arbitral 
institutions, as most arbitral institutions lack the requisite digital 
infrastructure, such as web pages.14 Therefore, such an alternative 
may be implemented after institutional arbitration becomes more 
developed in the country.  
Another issue which requires immediate discussion is the effect of 
the Perkins judgment on ongoing arbitrations in which a sole 
arbitrator has been unilaterally appointed. The Delhi High Court in 
the case of Proddatur Cable TV Digi Services vs. Siti Cable Network 
Limited15  has held that the Perkins judgment is applicable to 
                                                          
13Vikas Mahendra & Shalija Agarwal, Paving the way for Institutional 
Appointment of Arbitrators and Use of Technology in Arbitration, BAR & 
BENCH (Nov. 29, 2019), https://barandbench.com/paving-way-for-
institutional-appointment-of-arbitrators-use-of-technology-in-
arbitration/. 
14See Report of the High-Level Committee to Review the 
Institutionalisation of Arbitration Mechanism in India, Department of 
Legal Affairs (July 30, 2017), 
http://legalaffairs.gov.in/sites/default/files/Report-HLC.pdf. 
15Proddatur Cable Tv Digi Services v. Siti Cable Network, 2020 SCC 
Online Del 350. 
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ongoing arbitrations and in such cases, the mandate of an arbitrator 
terminates under Section 14(1)(a) of the Act. 16 In the light of this 
ruling, the only possible solution to continue ongoing arbitration 
proceedings would be that the arbitrator obtains written consent 
from both the parties. Such ex-post-facto consent can be construed 
as retrospective consent operating from the date of appointment. 
This would satisfy the requirement of mutual consent for the 
appointment of an arbitrator and make unilateral appointments 
valid. 
6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, it can be stated that the present judgment is a notable 
development in as much as it has finally resolved the issue of 
unilateral appointment of the arbitrator, which remained 
unaddressed by the 2015 Amendment as well as the 2019 
Amendment. On the other hand, the judgment is flawed, as the 
Court has misinterpreted the TRF judgment and has resorted to 
judicial legislation. Nevertheless, it can be seen that the Perkins 
judgment has already started affecting the appointment procedure 
of arbitrators in India. Therefore, it’s important to determine what 
amendments would need to be made in the procedure of 
appointing arbitrators and further determine what the role of 
arbitral institutions would be within that sphere. 
 
                                                          
16See also Bharat Broadband Network Limited vs. United Telecoms 
Limited, (2019) 5 S.C.C. 755 (India). 
